Wanted – A Coordinate Executive Intelligence Agency for the National Security Community, Group Captain John O. Ojikutu (Retired) - December, 2010

“Decision Makers  often forget that intelligence is as important as the armed strength of the state security forces and more than often, they forget also that, it is the first line of the national defence against any threat” (Stanley L. Falk in National Security Management, 1972)

One of the heroes in the US war against terrorist’s threats who most Americans will for a long time continue to admire for his candid opinion and courageous expressions on the work in the US Intelligence Community is Richard Clerk, an Intelligence Analyst and a former Coordinator of the Counterterrorist’s Security Group of the National Security Council in the Bush Administration.  Richard Clerk it was, who out of frustration of the Bush government inaction against terrorists threats, wrote Condi Rice, then the National Security Adviser to President Bush on Tuesday September 4^th, 2001 that “…… imagine a day after hundreds of Americans lay dead at home or abroad after a terrorist attack and ask themselves what else they could have done”.  That was seven days before the Tuesday September 11^th, 2001 attacks on the US.

Clerk had told the US Congressional Hearing during the investigation into the 9/11 terrorists attacks on the US that “…..while the Bush Administration listened to me, it didn’t either believed me that there was an urgent problem or was unprepared to act as though there were an urgent problem” In his remarks at the same Congressional Hearing, he had told the American citizens present and those watching on national TV that “….. your government failed you, those entrusted with protecting you failed you.  We tried hard, but that doesn’t matter because we failed”. 

These candid expressions, essentially a critical assessment of a government by a senior government official is very rear and definitely not in the attitude or character of most government officials or political office holders to criticize the government under which they serve.  But the kind of frustration which Richard Clerk faced before the 9/11 that made him confront the National Security Adviser was the type that had overwhelmed most angered Nigerians following the Abuja bomb blast that killed 14 and injured 66 innocent Nigerians during the 50^th independence Anniversary in October and the recent one at the Mogadishu Military Barracks Abuja that killed about 11 persons on the new year eve and injured 13 persons .It was the type that troubled some others following the attacks on the offshore Bonga Oil platform and the Atlas Cove Oil Depot in Lagos.  The same frustration you probably would find among some other Nigerians over the various arms cache found in some containers at the Apapa seaports.

These examples of public frustrations were the results of government inactions and missed signals from the opportunities that would have been presented by intelligence for decision makers to counter the threats to national security before they become operational or active. Intelligence as it were, is about gathering information on imminent threats and analysing them into Pre emption and for Disruption. While pre emption is about pre empting the threat and determining the mode, timings location or target of threats and identifying those behind it, Disruption on the other hand is to prevent or interdict the threat at the planning stage before it becomes operational or active and arresting the actors for prosecutions.

The Nigerian experience does not only demonstrated the lack of understanding of intelligence as distinct from the strength of the state security forces, but also the unwillingness of the security forces to collaborate and to jointly attack the threats. The challenges in the management of the national security system are more than the prospect of establishing new or Special Forces in addition to the present forces structures or the installation of high technical surveillance system. These challenges require the government to examine the effectiveness and efficiency of the present structure and determine what we have done wrong, what we have failed to do right or why we have failed to the right things.

Nigerian Security Management Challenges

Before the occurrence of the most dastardly attacks between the months of October and December, there were evidence in some media reports suggesting that the government and the security agencies had prior knowledge with sufficient time to nip the threats of the attacks in the bud at the planning stages. They for instance, had ample time to interdict the arms cache at the Apapa Wharf between July when it arrived, and October when they were eventually discovered during a re-shipment to the Gambia.  Rather than take responsibility for their failures and the lack of coordinate intelligence in the decision making process, government agencies and political officials response was to be defensive of their inactions, criticising each others agencies, and hiding behind the veil of secrecy or national security.  Yet, in the words of Craig Whitney of the New York Times, they forget that “accountability from elected and appointed officials of government when something goes terribly wrong are the basic responsibilities to citizens in a democracy”. 

Assessing government security agencies failures and inactions in matters of national security is to demand accountability from government decision makers and its intelligence services  by asking to know, how much intelligence they all had or derived from the threat warnings given by MEND weeks before each attack particularly, those aimed at “the heart of the nation”? For example, did our decision makers not know from intelligence that “the heart of the nation” as MEND had put it in some of its early warnings may not literarily mean Abuja the Federal Capital geographically situated at the heart of the country, but could also mean, the live wires of the nations ecomony represented in the Bonga Oil Rig Platform, the Atlas Cove Oil Depot and the oil pipelines which are prime symbols of economic importance to the country?  Has the government security agencies been able to draw further intelligence to identify and provide protections for other symbols of economic importance which could be potential targets of attacks to our home grown terrorists? 

Following the bombing of the Atlas Cove Oil Depot in Lagos, and while not trying to do the job for the terrorists,  I alerted some government officials and decision makers asking: who is responsible for keeping watch over other symbols of economic importance in this nation which may include our air and sea ports, the bridges over rivers Niger and Benue connecting the South to the North and East to West including those connecting Lagos Island to the Mainland, the power generating stations and transmitting lines, communications network, major  oil refineries, oil and gas pipelines, major military installations and strategic industries etc?

Have our security agencies been able to identify Nigerians who are threats or are of high risks to the national security particularly, among our politicians and within the religion and ethnic militant groups irrespective of the magnanimity in the current government amnesty programme?  How many of these persons are under surveillance or have been put under security watch-list? Above all, who are those behind the political killings, incessant kidnappings, recurring religious rioting particularly the Boko Haram and Jos crisis etc?  Why have we not been able to find the intelligent solutions to all these or better still what are the intelligence behind them?

In retrospect and against the background of what some observers adjudged as credible information from the MEND early warnings, or actionable intelligence from foreign sources, what did government security agencies and decision makers do to protect Nigerians during the 50^th Independent Anniversary in the light of the information that were available to them weeks before the event?  Why did the security agencies not prohibit or restrict the movement and parking of vehicles within a radius of 1 – 2km to the anniversary ground or why did the responsible agency not provide controlled corridors for screened private vehicles and public   transport into the event area? Were there no security patrols and surveillance around anniversary ground before and during the celebration, to lookout for the presence of abnormal behaviors and the absence of normal behaviors?  Most importantly, which agency was responsible to coordinate intelligence and security for the management of security during the anniversary?

The discoveries of the arm cache at the Apapa seaports have some semblance of the arm cache on a cargo plane that landed at Kano International Airport sometime ago. With no coordinate intelligence consideration, Security agencies concluded that the arms were destined for the Niger Delta.  When the investigation was eventually carried out and completed, the aircraft was released on “orders from above” and left to departed with the cargo of arms to a destination that was not in the Niger Delta or in any part of Nigeria.

 In that similar fashion, while the discovery of the arm cache was being unfolded at the Apapa Wharf the Israeli coordinate intelligence network tracking the containers of the arms from Iran into Lagos came out categorically to state that the arms were destined to Gaza.  In converse, our security services insisted that the arms were meant for discharge in Nigeria even when there was nothing to suggest that the national intelligence officers at the Nigerian Embassies in Iran and India, the origin and the first point of call of the arms respectively, had alerted or shared any information with the SSS which was contrary to the statement credited to the Israeli Embassy in Lagos.

These examples of missed signals and evidence of missed opportunities in our security management system show clearly that our security agencies do not sufficiently network or share analysis from their intelligence among themselves. This perception among security agencies that they have ownership of the intelligence they acquire impedes the flow of information.  In effect, information analysts in the responsible agencies are often denied access to critical intelligence held in other security community.  This perception is further made more serious by the lack of a coordinate executive agency that is statutorily responsible to collate intelligence derived from the various Security agencies into a coherent whole for the National Security Council to sufficiently advise the President or for the president himself to take effective decisions on matters concerning national security.

Structural Challenges and Recommendations

The Punch Newspaper succinctly captured the lack of collaboration among our security agencies on its headlines of October14th, 2010 where it reported the “Rivalry between SSS police threatens Probe” following the Abuja bomb blast. The paper expressly stated that “the two agencies have been carrying out their investigation without sharing information and evidence on the blast that killed i4 persons and injured 66 persons”’. It went further to report that “.the mastermind would not have succeeded if the two agencies had collaborated when intelligence reports that some people were planning to bomb Abuja reach them.” The paper concluded with a barn- door – closed – after- the – horses- have escaped claim by the SSS ‘’which believe that “it should be at the forefront of the investigation because the incident undermined the National Security since it was meant to disrupt a National Celebration attended by the President, other senior government officials and visiting head of states”. 

These evidences of consistent lack of collaboration among security agencies   requires government to define the line of responsibility between each agencies in matters of national security and determine which of them is responsible for interdicting threats at the planning stage and which is responsible for arrests and prosecution after the acts.

With these obvious flaws and gaps in the national security management in an environment that is largely characterised by home grown terrorists masquerading as religious fanatics and ethnic militants, and in an election year that is perverted with inflammatory utterances coming from our supposedly elite statesmen and politicians, the present insecurity has gotten to a crescendo that is beyond the establishment of additional security agencies or the deployment of tens of CCTVs. We have more than enough security agencies from the traditional armed forces of Army, Navy and Air Force, the Police, SSS and the NSCDC for the territorial and internal security, to the immigration and customs services for the border security. We also get early warnings from friendly countries and most times too from the home grown terrorists themselves than whatever we may possibly get from the CCTVs that may not function most of the times due to inadequate power supply.

Recommendations

The federal government will need more than warning pronouncement to the criminals.  Our starting point should be to determine how effectively and efficiently we have been utilising the existing assets of human capital and infrastructure within the national security systems. In addition, the federal government would need to urgently review the chain of control of the security agencies organic intelligence units with a view to restructuring them into an effective and efficient network with a platform for collaboration. The aim is to provide a coherent and cohesive intelligence support for the decision making process in the National Security Council and for the President.

Secondly, government should review and consider amendments to executive policies, orders and procedures that govern national security classifications of intelligence information in an effort to expand access to relevant information for federal agencies outside the intelligence community, for states, local authorities and the Nigeria public which are critical to the fight against terrorism.

Thirdly, government should begin the process of amending the National Security Act to create and sufficiently staff a statutory Executive Director of National Intelligence as distinct from the National Intelligence Agency in the Foreign Affairs Ministry and the non-executive Office of the National Security Adviser.  The Director of the proposed National Intelligence Agency should be the President’s principal adviser on intelligence and should have the full arrangement of management, budgetary and personnel responsibilities needed to make the entire national intelligence communities operate as a coherent whole. No person however, should simultaneously serve as both the National Security Adviser and Director of National Intelligence Agency or as the Director of any other specific intelligence or security agency.

A Statutory Executive Director of National Intelligence as distinct from the National Security Adviser should coordinate intelligence from the executive agencies mainly of the Defence, SSS, Police, Border Security (Custom and Immigration) Internal Affairs and Foreign Affairs Ministries etc.  This Directorate should collate, analyse and evaluate information received from these intelligence community agencies and disseminate intelligence to the National Security Council (NSC) and to the President.

Perhaps, it could be argued by some that the Joint Intelligence Board chaired by the National Security Adviser functions well as an intelligence community.  Unfortunately constitutionally, the Joint Intelligence Board as presently constituted is not a statutory body, and the National Security Adviser too, though a member of the National Security Council (NSC) has no executive or statutory power like the other members over any member of the JIB on national security. 

It is important to stress finally, that the National Security Adviser is a part of the Presidency and essentially too, like the other President’s Advisers, an advisory arm of the Presidency rather than a policy making body. He can only make recommendations for the President and only him as the Commander in Chief can take decisions on national security matters.  A decision he can not delegate to any Agency, Committee or individual. The President can however delegate the execution   of his decision on national security to the constitutionally responsible agency, department or ministry. Even when he sits as the chairman of the NSC and indicates agreement with specific recommendation, this does not become a decision or presidential order until the council or the NSC present a final document to him and secure his written and signed approval, before it can become a Government Policy, Presidential Decisions, Directives or Orders.